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Abstract
We exploit the unique features of the promotion system for French academics to examine
the causes of the promotion gap between men and women. Promotions occur through
national competitions for which we have information on candidates and on those eligible
to be candidates. We find that gender has no significant eﬀect on candidates promotion
rates. In contrast, women have a lower probability to be candidates, which is not driven by
diﬀerences in the objective costs or rewards of the contest. A possible interpretation of our
results is that women are less willing than men to participate in contests, in line with recent
experimental evidence.
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1 Introduction
Despite the rapid increase in female educational attainment over the last decades, the labour
market outcomes of men and women still diﬀer in terms of wages and seniority. The literature on
gender wage gaps is vast, but diﬀerences across genders in promotions have received much less
attention. These gaps can be large. For example, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find that women
account for only 2.5 percent of top executives in US firms. Gobillon, Meurs and Roux (2015)
show for France that the gender gap in the probability of being an executive increases along the
wage ladder from 9% to 50%. Diﬀerences in characteristics account for a large proportion of the
gap, with the remaining fraction being usually attributed to preferences or discrimination.1
Measuring the role played by these two aspects has proven diﬃcult. This paper uses the
particular features of the French academic system, namely the fact that promotions occur
through national contests, to look at various causes for the lower promotion rates of females
and discriminate among them.
The observed promotion rates may be due to lower success rates of female candidates or to
them being less likely than men to seek promotion. In the US and the UK academic systems or in
private sector jobs only information on actual promotions is available, while the list of applicants
tends not to be known.2 In France, academic promotion occurs through a national contest or
concours, with the lists of applicants being publicly available at the time of the concours.
Moreover, because academics are public servants, we have information on those holding junior
positions which constitute the pool of ‘potential applicants’. We can hence examine not only
whether gender aﬀects a candidate’s promotion probability, but also whether it impacts the
decision to be a candidate.
Using data for academics has important advantages. Unlike in many private sector jobs,
where a promotion is associated with longer hours and a requirement for greater availability
outside normal working hours, academics have similar obligations and constraints at all hier-
archical levels. Even if more senior academics tend to be involved in university administration
and outside responsibilities such as participating in committees, seeking funding or performing
editorial activities, these activities are to a large extent voluntary. They are not ‘required’
by the promotion and not performing them would not imply that the individual is demoted.
Female associate professors should thus not feel more constrained in terms of combining career
and family duties by becoming full professors, and there is hence no obvious reason why they
would prefer not to be promoted. Male and female academics are also likely to have rather
homogeneous labour market attachment, as argued by Kahn (1995), removing one of the rea-
sons often branded to justify lower promotion rates for females. A further advantage of these
data is that, unlike for most types of jobs, the key consideration in actual promotion deci-
sions, an individual’s productivity (publications), can be observed and thus controlled for by
the researcher.
In this context, we consider several potential causes of the unexplained component of pro-
1For an overview of work on gender wage gaps see Blau and Kahn (2000). On one hand of the spectrum,
Goldin and Rouse (2000) provide evidence of discrimination against women, on the other, Ichino and Moretti
(2009) trace gender gaps to biological diﬀerences.
2An exception is the analysis of auditions for orchestra membership and promotion in Goldin and Rouse
(2000).
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motions gaps. On the one hand, women may be less likely to be promoted conditional on
having applied, and this could be due either to discrimination or poor performance during the
concours. On the other, female academics may have a lower propensity to apply for promotion
than males, which could be explained by the requirements of the contest being more costly for
women, to their facing a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ between salaries and department prestige, or simply
to an unwillingness to enter the contest. The special features of the French academic system,
such as a national salary scale and the existence of several categories of academics with diﬀerent
requirements during the contest and upon promotion, allow us to test for these hypotheses.
We use data for academic economists in France over the period 1991 to 2008, and find lower
promotion rates for women, which are partly but not completely explained by the age structure
and publication records. We then consider separately the determinants of the likelihood to enter
a promotion concours and the probability of being promoted conditional on having entered the
concours. We find no significant eﬀect of gender on the latter, thus rejecting the idea that
females underperform in contests, and providing no support to the presence of discrimination
against women. In contrast, being a woman has a substantial negative eﬀect on the likelihood
to enter the concours.
We explore several potential explanations for this diﬀerence. We find no evidence that
either a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ between income and department prestige nor the cost undertaking
the concours and the mobility implications associated with it (see below) are the causes of
the gender gap. The results seem to indicate that women are less willing than men to enter
competitions for promotion, and this could be due either to diﬀerent attitudes towards contests
or to the expectation of being discriminated against. When we look at features of each year’s
concours, we find evidence consistent with both aspects.
Our contribution is twofold. First, the paper adds to the literature examining the diﬀerent
rates of promotion across genders; see, amongst others, Lazear and Rosen (1990), Winter-Ebmer
and Zweimuller (1997) and Goldin and Rouse (2000). Several papers use data on academics
to try to understand gender gaps in labour markets, dating back to the seminal work of Cole
and Cole (1973). Early on, empirical analyses identified both lower wages and lower promotion
rates for female economists; see Johnson and Staﬀord (1974) and Farber (1977). More recent
work, such as Ginther and Hayes (1999) and Ginther and Kahn (2004), indicates that in the
US salary gaps are explained by diﬀerences in academic rank, while promotions to tenure and
to full professor rank are still aﬀected by gender even after controlling for research output and
demographic characteristics. Some studies claim a decline in the promotion gap over time, while
others find that it is large even in recent decades; see McDowell, Singell and Ziliak (2001) and
Ginther and Kahn (2004). Evidence for the UK by Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2005) indicates
that there are both gaps in promotions and in within-rank pay across genders, and their findings
suggest that these are partly due to diﬀerences in the outside oﬀers received by men and by
women, while Sabatier (2010) documents the existence of a promotion gap in France.3 Most
of this literature has considered the US and the UK, which have an academic labour market
with much greater wage and promotion flexibility than those found in most European countries.
Our paper examines whether promotion gaps also exist in a labour market that operates in an
3A number of recent analyses focus on the eﬀect of the sex of committee members on female promotions; see,
for example, Lavy (2008) and Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010).
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entirely diﬀerent way, with salaries being fixed at the country-wide level and promotions being
decided by national committees and not by the department where the individual is employed.
The paper also provides evidence on female attitudes towards competition in an actual
labour market and hence adds to the growing body of work that has addressed this question
but which has so far been mainly based on experimental evidence. This literature has pro-
posed an alternative explanation for women’s poorer performance in labour markets. Recent
work finds that women tend to be less likely to enter competitions and tend to perform worse
in competitions than men; since promotions to top jobs tend to be highly competitive, such
behaviour could explain why we observe fewer women in these jobs. Our conclusions are partly
supportive of what the experimental literature has found. In line with the results in Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval (2013)
we find that once we control for observed productivity, women are less likely than men to enter
the concours and that this diﬀerence does not depend on the objective costs associated with
the contest. In contrast, the finding that women are as likely to be promoted conditional on
being a candidate can be interpreted as a lack of evidence for the underperformance in contests
found by Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003).
The paper is organised as follows. After describing the French academic system, section 2
examines the possible reasons why women are less likely to be promoted. Section 3 describes
the data, an exhaustive panel of academic economists in France over the period 1991 to 2008.
Our results are presented in section 4, while section 5 concludes.
2 Why are there so few female professors?
2.1 The French academic system
The French academic system has a number of features that we intend to exploit to test possible
causes of the low rate of promotion of females in academia. We start this section with a
description of the French system, and turn next to the various hypotheses.
There are two types of academic positions in France. The most common are university
positions, where the individual is a professor with a substantial teaching load. There exist also
a number of public research instances, of which the largest is the Cnrs, that have pure research
positions.4 Researchers in this category are hired by the Cnrs, who pay their salaries, but
are attached to a university and are hence located in its economics department just like the
university professors are. Researchers have the possibility to undertake some teaching and they
participate in department life in the same way as standard professors.
For all types of position there is an entry level category equivalent to assistant professor,
termed ‘Rank B’, which includes the maˆıtre de confe´rences positions at the university and
the charge´ de recherche at the Cnrs. The individual can then be promoted to ‘Rank A’, the
equivalent to full professor, a position denoted directeur de recherche at the Cnrs. Both rank A
and rank B positions are tenured, which implies that an individual who does not get a promotion
4Cnrs stands for Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. There are other instances, such as the Institut
National de la Recherche Agronomique, which accounts for about 5% of the academic economists in France.
Unfortunately we have not been able to obtain the list of candidates for promotion for those and hence will not
include them in our analysis.
4
can spend her/his entire career in a ‘junior’, i.e. rank B, position. Because of this possibility, we
will term the two types of positions ‘rank B’ and ‘rank A’, rather than junior and senior. The
promotion from rank B to rank A entails a substantial salary increase and a much steeper slope
for salaries over time. The salary scales are identical for university professors and researchers
and set by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research.5
Promotions take place through a national contest, a concours, and are thus not decided
by the department in which the individual holds her/his current position.6 Participation in
this contest is public information, and at the end of it a list with the ranking of those that
have undertaken it is published. The fact that departments do not make promotion decisions is
important for our purposes. In a system in which there is a positive correlation between prestige
and promotion threshold, women could choose to select into less prestigious department because
promotion is easier in those, and hence the measured gap would underestimate the actual
promotion gap. A second feature of the French system is that there is no relationship between
department prestige and salaries. Academic salaries are determined according to a national
scale based on rank, and rank is decided at the national level.7 There is thus no reason to prefer
being employed in a less prestigious department since salaries are the same across universities
and the threshold for promotion is set nationally.
Members of the national committees that decide on promotion are academic economists,
drawn from various universities in the country and areas of expertise. Committees tend to
be large and represent a wide spectrum of universities, not necessarily the most prestigious.
Because members of these committees have to be of the full professor rank and because of
the age distribution of the population of academics, there is a strong male dominance in these
committees. Committees change regularly, every two to four years depending on the particular
instance.
The requirement of the concours diﬀers across the two academic tracks. For university
professors the contest, termed concours d’agregation, is biannual and entails four stages over,
approximately, a 6-month period. It includes a research seminar, and three oral exams both
in the candidate’s field and in economics in general, one of which consisted of preparing in
24 hours a lecture on a topic randomly drawn by the applicant from a lengthy predetermined
list. The concours hence takes time and requires substantial preparation outside the candidates
field of expertise. In contrast the eﬀort involved in the Cnrs promotion concours is minimal.
The candidate simply declares him/herself a candidate for a position as directeur de recherche
(DR) and submits a vitae and research proposal to the committee. This concours takes place
annually.
There is a second diﬀerence in terms of the costs involved in the two systems. For university
professors, a list of open positions is published and at the end of the concours candidates choose,
sequentially and starting with the highest ranked, which department to join. When promoted,
5Within each broad rank, A and B, there are subranks that aﬀect salary. Subrank promotion is also decided
by a national committee, although the cost here is minimal, with application for a promotion requiring filling a
form and submitting a vitae. Promotion to a higher subrank does not involve change of department, the number
of promotions is not fixed ex ante, and the list of candidates is not public knowledge.
6Some internal promotions exist for individuals that have undertaken substantial administrative tasks at the
university, but they are rare. See Combes, Linnemer and Visser (2008) for more details.
7Some departments pay, out of their own funds, an extra salary on top of the one paid by the university/cnrs.
This practice is, however, restricted to only a few members in a handful of departments.
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the individual is usually not able to stay in the university where s/he held a rank B position
and has to move to a diﬀerent department.8 After three years s/he is allowed to move to
another university, if the latter wishes to recruit her/him, including the university where s/he
held the rank B position. For researchers, academics that are promoted can choose to stay at
the university where they are or move to another department. The university does not need to
have an open position for them since the researchers’ salary is always paid by the Cnrs.
It is obvious that promotion is very costly for university professors. There is a cost that
in principle is gender-neutral, the cost of preparing the various exams. The agregation also
involves a substantial cost ex post both because of the geographical mobility involved in being
promoted to full professor, but also because the individual faces considerable uncertainty about
where s/he will be eventually recruited if successful. Since candidates seeking to become full
professor are typically between 30 and 40 years of age, the process occurs at a moment in the
life-cycle when family constraints are likely to be substantial. If women are less geographically
mobile than men, then the cost is likely to be greater for them.
There are hence two diﬀerences between the agregation and the Cnrs concours. First, the
former involves substantial costs that do not exist for the later. Second, performance during
the contest only matters in the agregation, as in the Cnrs the committee bases the decision on
the vitae without meeting the candidates.9
2.2 Discrimination, diﬀerences in payoﬀs or self-selection?
Although a substantial literature has examined the promotion gap across genders, a clear expla-
nation is still lacking. Women may be less likely to be promoted either because they apply for
promotion less often than men or because of a lower probability of being promoted conditional
on being a candidate. These diﬀerences may in turn have three possible causes: discrimination,
diﬀerences across genders in the costs of or rewards from promotion, and diﬀerent attitudes in
and towards the promotion process itself.
Existing work has had diﬃculty in testing these diﬀerent hypotheses. Part of the problem
is the fact that, generally, there exists no record of who applied for promotion or of who could
have applied. It is hence impossible to know whether the higher probability of men to hold a
senior position is due to a lower conditional probability of success of women or to their lower
propensity to apply. Moreover, even if data on applications were available, the trade-oﬀ that
exists in the Anglo-Saxon academic system between prestige of the department and promotion
thresholds makes it diﬃcult to assess the possible causes of a lower application propensity. In
contrast, the French system presents a number of features that will allow us to evaluate the
various hypotheses.
To understand the possible mechanisms in operation consider the following model of pro-
motion. Suppose that individual i is a candidate for promotion at time t. The (conditional)
8In our sample, 80% of those promoted through the agregation have a new aﬃliation after their promotion.
9A question that we have not addressed is whether the degree of competition is greater for university professors
or for researchers. On the one hand, a much smaller number of researchers are promoted each year in the Cnrs
than in the concours d’agregation. On the other, although the list of candidates and rankings are available on
internet for both, the agregation solicits much greater interest from the academic community, with results at
each stage being widely followed and discussed, which increases the preasure on candidates. It is hence diﬃcult
to argue that one or the other contest is more competitive.
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probability of success of individual i at time t, denoted Prj(S, i, t), is given by Φ (X ￿itpj) , where
Φ (.) is a function of individual characteristics, X ￿it, and pj is the associated vector of coeﬃcients.
The subscript j = u, r denotes whether the model applies to data for university professors or
researchers.
We assume the following specification:
X ￿itpu = pu0 + p
f
0 δi + pu1 ×Outputit + pu2 × Effortit (1)
X ￿itpr = pr0 + p
f
0 δi + pr1 ×Outputit (2)
The variable δi is a dummy taking the value 1 for females. The two individual variables deter-
mining the probability of success in the contest are the individual’s research output, Outputit,
and his/her eﬀort, Effortit which matters only for the university track.
The first possible explanation for the promotion gap across genders is simply that those
making the promotion decisions discriminate against women, in which case pf0 < 0 and measures
the gender gap in promotion due to discrimination, which we assume to be the same across
tracks. Female candidates may also be less likely to succeed if they tend to underperform in
contests, as shown by Gneezy et al. (2003). Obviously, eﬀort cannot be observed so we suppose
that pu2 × Effortit = pu2 + pfu2 δi, with pfu2 < 0 if women exert lower eﬀort. We can hence
write
X ￿itpu = pu4 + p
f
u4 δi + pu1 ×Outputit (3)
where pfu4 = p
f
0 + p
f
u2 captures both the eﬀect of discrimination and of eﬀort, and p
f
u4 ≤ pf0 .
Alternatively, women may diﬀer in the costs of and rewards from promotion and this can
make them less willing to apply for promotion, causing ‘self-selection’ out of the promotion race.
The decision whether to be a candidate is determined by a comparison between individual costs
and benefits from entering the contest. An individual will be a candidate if and only if the
expected cost, Cij , is lower than the product of the expected probability of success, ￿Prj(S, i, t),
and the value of being promoted, Vijt. That is, if
Cij < ￿Prj(S, i, t)× Vijt (4)
We suppose that costs are given by
Ciu = c0 + c
f
0 δi + (c1 + c
f
1 δi) × T ime+ (c2 + cf2 δi)×Moving (5)
Cir = c0 + c
f
0 δi (6)
where the terms c0 and c
f
0 capture any psychological or subjective costs incurred when taking
part in a contest, and for the university track (but not for researchers) there are additional
costs due to the time required to prepare the contest, T ime, and the expected probability of
moving place of residence, Moving. Since none of these costs can be observed, we express
the cost for professors as Ciu = cu0 + c
f
u0 δi, where cu0 = c0 + c1 × T ime + c2 ×Moving and
cfu0 = c
f
0 + c
f
1 × T ime+ cf2 × Moving. Then cfu0 ≥ cf0 , as the costs of taking part in the contest
are at least as large for professors as for researchers.
In the US system, there is no reason why women may have diﬀerent objective costs of pro-
7
motion from men. In contrast, in the French system, there may be diﬀerences across the sexes:
the opportunity cost of time could be higher for women if they undertake a disproportionate
amount of domestic work, while diﬀerences in intra-household bargaining power could make it
harder for female than for male professors to impose the cost of moving on their families.
Women may also choose not to apply for promotion because they are less inclined to compete
in tournaments than men, as indicated by experimental evidence; see Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) and Gupta et al. (2013) as well as the discussion in
Bertrand (2011). Given the competitive nature of most promotions, if women are less inclined
to enter competitions, then they will apply less often than men even if the objective costs and
benefits are the same. This diﬀerence is captured by the term cf0 , which would be positive if
the subjective costs of competing are higher for women than for men.
Turning to the expected value of being promoted, we suppose it to take the form
Viut = v0 + (v1 + v
f
1 δi)Incomet + (v2 + v
f
2 δi)× (Deptit+1 −Deptit) (7)
Virt = v0 + (v1 + v
f
1 δi)Incomet (8)
The intrinsic value of the promotion is given by v0, which we assume is common across sexes
and tracks. The variable Incomet captures the increase in income associated with promotion,
while the dummy Deptit has a value of 1 if the candidate is in a top department. The last
term hence captures the cost to those passing the agregation of moving from a top to a less
good department, which is not present for researchers. Men and women may have diﬀerent
preferences over department prestige and income. Suppose that women have a lower marginal
utility of income because, often, they are the second earner in the household, then vf1 < 0.
Women could also have stronger preferences for department quality, which would be captured
by vf2 > 0. In either case, women would be less willing to trade-oﬀ department quality for income
and this would make female professors in top departments less likely to apply for promotion
than males.10
Lastly, consider the expected probability of being promoted. Let ￿Prj(S, i, t) = Φ ￿X ￿i(g)t￿pj￿
where all the coeﬃcients ￿pj are now those the agent believes to apply, which may diﬀer from
the true coeﬃcients. Any variable that makes this expected probability lower, will reduce the
likelihood of an individual seeking promotion. If, for example, women believe that they will be
discriminated against, i.e. that ￿pf0 < 0, then they will be less likely to apply for promotion than
men irrespective of whether they are actually discriminated.
In this context, it is possible to test the various hypotheses by examining both the proba-
bility of succeeding in the promotion contest and the probability of being a candidate, and by
exploiting the diﬀerences between the implications of promotion for university professors and
for researchers. We do so as follows:
Discrimination: Discrimination is captured by pf0 < 0, and implies a negative impact of
being female on the conditional probability of promotion in the two tracks.
Underperformance in contests: Underperformance in contests implies pfu4 < p
f
0 , that is, a
more negative coeﬃcient on gender for professors than for researchers.
10See McDowell et al. (2001) for a discussion concerning the US, where more prestigious departments also have
tougher promotion thresholds making it diﬃcult to understand the reasons behind the promotion gap.
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Higher objective cost of promotion: If women were not trying to get promoted because of
the cost of mobility, then cfu0 > c
f
0 , i.e. there would be a more negative eﬀect of being female
on the probability of applying for promotion for professors than for researchers.
Diﬀerences in preferences about prestige and salary : This eﬀect implies that female profes-
sors will be less willing to apply for promotion if they are in a top department than if they are
not. Because promotion does not require changing department for researchers, we would expect
to find no diﬀerences in the probability of applying for promotion for female researchers across
departments.
Expected discrimination: To examine whether women’s belief that they will be discriminated
against aﬀects their propensity to seek promotion, we proxy expected discrimination by the
fraction of rank A professors that are women in a particular year, as a greater fraction could be
interpreted by candidates as weaker discrimination. A positive eﬀect of this variable interacted
with being female would indicate that women’s decision to seek promotion responds to the
observed promotion rate of women in the past.
Unwillingness to participate in contests : Women may also be less willing to take part in
contests because of a subjective cost of competing captured by cf0 > 0. Our data does not allow
for a direct test of this hypothesis.
2.3 Empirical specification
To start with, we follow the existing literature and suppose that the probability of individual i
being rank R at year t is given by
Prj(R, i, t) = Φ
￿
X ￿itβj
￿
(9)
where the two states R are being rank A or not, and Φ (.) denotes the logistic density function.
The term X ￿itβj in equation (9) is
X ￿itβj = βj0 + β
f
j0 δi + βj1 Ageit + βj2 Age
2
it + βj3 Pubit
+βj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + βj5 Pubit ×Quality it (10)
implying that the probability of promotion is a function of age Ageit and its square, whether or
not the individual has published in Econlit-classed journals (i.e. whether s/he is a ‘publisher’
measured by the dummy Pubit), the number of publications and the average quality of these
publications, denoted respectively Quantity it and Quality it, both measured in logs (see below
for the exact measurement). With δi being a dummy for females, β
f
0 measures the diﬀerences in
promotion probability for men and women with the same characteristics. We would have liked
to control for characteristics of the individual’s family life, such as whether s/he is married and
the number and ages of children, but such data were not available.11
Consider next the probability that individual i applies for promotion (i.e. takes the concours)
11In the light of existing evidence, this is likely not to be a major omission; for example, Ginther and Kahn
(2004) find that having children has only a weak eﬀect of the promotion probabilities of female economists in the
US and none on their productivity.
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at time t, which we assume to be
Prj(C, i, t) = Φ
￿
X ￿itγj
￿
(11)
where the two states C are being a candidate for promotion or not and
X ￿itγj = γj0 + γ
f
j0 δi + γj1 Ageit + γj2 Age
2
it + γj3 Pubit
+γj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + γj5 Pubit ×Quality it (12)
+γj6 Deptit + γ
f
j6 δi Deptit
The dummy Deptit has a value of 1 if the candidate is in a top department (see below for the
definition) and will capture whether individuals in top departments are less likely to apply for
promotion because of the mobility costs involved.
Lastly, the probability of success in a concours conditional on being a candidate is given by
Prj(S, i, t|Cit = 1) = Φ
￿
X ￿itαj
￿
(13)
where the two states S are succeeding or failing in the concours (i.e. being promoted or not),
Cit is a dummy that takes the value one if the individual applied for promotion, and
X ￿itαj = αj0 + α
f
j0 δi + αj1 Ageit + αj2 Age
2
it + αj3 Pubit
+αj4 Pubit ×Quantity it + αj5 Pubit ×Quality it (14)
+αj6 Deptit
Obviously, the qualities that lead to promotion conditional on applying are also those that make
a potential candidate apply, hence it is not possible to run a selection model.
Equations (9) and (10) capture the mechanism usually examined in the literature on aca-
demic promotions. Assuming that the estimated coeﬃcient ￿βfj0 is diﬀerent from zero, we can
then estimate the other two models to see to what extent the diﬀerence in the probability of
being rank A is due to women being less likely to enter the concours or to them having a lower
success rate in the concours than men. That is, we are interested in whether γfj0 and α
f
j0 are
significantly diﬀerent from zero, as well as in the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients estimated
for the two tracks.
3 The Data
Our sample consists of the entire population of French academic economists provided by the
French Ministry of Higher Education and Research and the Cnrs for the years 1991 to 2008. For
each individual we have information on age, rank, publication stock (see below) and department.
We keep only individuals that are in departments larger than 4 full-time equivalent academics,
which removes economists that are isolated in universities without real economics departments.
Those (few) individuals for whom some of the individual characteristics (age or position for
instance) are missing are also excluded.
In order to examine separately the determinants of the probability of applying for promotion
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and the likelihood to succeed in the concours, we use the list of candidates that applied to and
those who succeeded in becoming a rank A university professor or a rank A Cnrs researcher
(DR). For professors we have the lists of candidates to promotion and actual promotions for
the nine biannual concours taking place from 1992 to 2008, while for researchers we have the
thirteen annual concours between 1996 and 2008.
Although all academic economists of rank B the year prior to the concours are eligible
for promotion, it is important to consider how to define potential candidates. Two issues are
relevant. First, it is possible for Cnrs researchers to take the agregation, and some individuals
in our dataset do so. In contrast, although it is in principle possible for rank B university
professors to apply for a rank A Cnrs position, there are in our data no such individuals. This
is probably due to the fact that few promotions are available each year (between 2 and 4)
and they are perceived as being internal promotions for those already in the Cnrs. We will
hence consider both those that hold a rank B position as professors or at the Cnrs as potential
candidates for the agregation but only those with a Cnrs rank B position as potential candidates
to promotion to DR. The second question is how to deal with older candidates, who may have
characteristics that may make them choose not to apply for promotion (poor publication record,
unsuccessful past applications, low unobserved ability, etc.). In order to avoid having in our pool
an increasing number of candidates unlikely to apply we introduce age limits. We hence consider
as potential candidates for the agregation all rank B economists aged between 28 and 49, and as
potential candidates for the Cnrs promotion the Cnrs rank B economists aged between 34 and
55.12 The lower bounds are given by the age of the youngest candidate in each concours, while
the upper bounds imply that we consider 97% and 91% of the candidates to the agregation and
the Cnrs promotion, respectively. These bounds yield 7,209 observations for the agregation,
while we have 1,004 observations for candidates susceptible to apply for Cnrs promotions.13
We define two categories of department, somewhat equivalent to the division in the US
between the top-50 and other departments. France has a substantial number of national aca-
demic publications in French, and hence we define prestigious departments as those that have
the largest research output in international journals (see Appendix A for details). For this
reason, we will term them ‘international’ departments and the rest ‘national’ departments. The
international departments account for about one third of the academics each year.
3.1 Measuring research output
Our key explanatory variable is an individual’s research output, and we measure the output of
individual i at date t by her/his cumulative publication record between the first year for which
we have an observation for that individual and date t.14 Publication records are measured
as weighted sums of publications. All publications come from the EconLit database, which
includes more than 560,000 papers published in more than 1200 journals between 1969 and 2008.
We merge the data on publications with the list of French academics that includes individual
12Robustness analysis indicates that all our results hold with diﬀerent upper bounds, and the results without
age limits are available at Bosquet, Combes and Garcia-Pen˜alosa (2013).
13The diﬀerence in the number of observations is mainly due to the fact that the Cnrs acounts for a small
fraction of academics.
14As an alternative, we have computed degressive publication scores, with older publications having a smaller
weight than recent ones. Measuring research output this way does not change our results.
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characteristics (position, department, age, gender), merging by surname and initial, and then
correct manually for those individuals having the same name and initial. Three dimensions
enter the weighted scheme of publications: the quality of journals, the number of authors and
the publication’s relative number of pages.
We measure the quality of publications using the journals weighting scheme proposed by
Combes and Linnemer (2010). Two diﬀerent degrees of convexity in the distribution of journals’
weights are proposed and we use the most convex one (i.e. the one that most values quality),
but our results are unchanged when we use the least convex one. We divide each publication
by the number of authors, a standard practice in the literature, and weight by the number of
pages to capture the idea that longer articles contain more ideas, considering an article’s length
relative to the average length in that journal the same year.
The output of individual i at date t is then a weighted sum of her/his articles a published
between the first year in which s/he published an article, t0, and date t, so that
yit =
￿
a∈[t0,t]
W (a)
n(a)
p(a)
p¯
(15)
where p(a) is the number of pages of article a, p¯ is the annual average number of pages of
articles in the journal, n(a) the number of authors of the article, and W (a) the weighting
scheme for journals. Each individual receives three scores: a dummy equal to 1 if s/he has
at least on publication in an EconLit-listed journal, the quantity of single-author-equivalent
published articles,
￿
a∈[t0,t] 1/n(a), and the average quality of her/his articles, defined as yit
divided by the quantity.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1: Percentage rank A by gender in 2008
rank A Total % Women % Men %
Total sample
0 1425 67.7 512 83.0 913 61.4
1 680 32.3 105 17.0 575 38.6
University professors (91% of population in 2008)
0 1321 69.0 477 83.5 844 62.8
1 593 31.0 94 16.5 499 37.2
Cnrs Researchers (9% of population in 2008)
0 104 54.5 35 76.1 69 47.6
1 87 45.5 11 23.9 76 52.4
Table 1 gives the decomposition of our sample in terms of institutional aﬃliation and rank
for the most recent year in our data, 2008. There were 2,105 (Cnrs and university) academic
economists in France that year, and the vast majority of the population consists of university
professors, with researchers accounting for only 9% of the total. Women account for 29% of
observations, and they are over-represented amongst university professors and under-represented
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amongst researchers, where they account for only 24% of the population. This diﬀerence could
be due to the fact that obtaining a position as a researcher tends to require a stronger publication
record than for university positions and, as we will see below, women tend to have a weaker
research output than men.
Slightly under a third of the population hold a rank A position, with the fraction being lower
for university professors (31%) and higher for researchers (45.5%). Note that the data do not
seem to indicate that women choose a career path that oﬀers higher average promotion rates,
which would counterbalance negative discrimination. Our data shows that feminisation is lower
for researchers, which have a higher promotion rate, indicating that there is no selection of this
type taking place. The gender promotion gap is large, 22 percentage points on average, and is
smaller for university professors than for researchers (21 and 29 points, respectively).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of potential candidates
Univ’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 1996-2008
Min. Max. Mean Std. err. Min. Max. Mean St. err.
Women
Prob. Candidate 0 1 0.078 0.268 0 1 0.129 0.336
Prob. Promotion 0 1 0.023 0.151 0 1 0.019 0.136
Age 28 49 37.9 5.6 34 55 42.4 5.9
Publisher 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.75 0.43
Quantity 0 15.0 1.13 1.63 0 15.0 2.53 2.94
Quality 0 62.5 0.52 3.18 0 33.7 1.52 5.04
Prob. Int. Dept. 0 1 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.54 0.50
Men
Prob. Candidate 0 1 0.125 0.331 0 1 0.181 0.385
Prob. Promotion 0 1 0.047 0.211 0 1 0.047 0.212
Age 28 49 39.5 5.7 25 55 40.9 7.8
Publisher 0 1 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.87 0.34
Quantity 0 21.2 1.59 2.22 0 16.6 3.18 2.98
Quality 0 54.7 0.62 3.30 0 86.5 2.72 7.62
Prob. Int. Dept. 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.56 0.50
Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Productivity measures (quantity and quality)
are in levels. We take their logs in the regression analysis. There are 7,209 observations from 1,853 individuals
and 1,004 observations from 181 individuals in the university and Cnrs samples respectively. These correspond
to 617 women (2,617 observations) and 1,236 men (4,592 observations) in the university sample and 58 women
(318 observations) and 123 men (686 observations) in the Cnrs sample.
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the sample of potential candidates. We have
7,209 observations, including a total of 1,853 academics. The panel is unbalanced as individuals
enter the pool of potential candidates (usually when they get their PhD) and exit it either
because they are promoted or because they leave academia or the country over our sample
period, with the average number of observations per individual being 3.9. The probability of
being a candidate to the aggregation is 7.8% for women and 12.5% for men, while for researchers
these figures are 12.9% and 18.1%. The (unconditional) probabilities of being promoted on a
given year are small, 4.7% for men, and 2.3% and 1.9% for women, depending on the track.
The table indicates that some of these diﬀerences are likely to be explained by diﬀerences in
observable characteristics. In our sample, the probability of publishing in EconLit journals is
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64% and 60% for men and women, respectively. This figure is not large, but it is important
to bear in mind that our publication criteria is stringent, especially given the strong tradition
in France to publish books and the large number of national journals, some of which are not
in EconLit. The quality of publications is somewhat higher for men (0.62 compared to 0.52),
while the quantity of publications is 41% higher for men. For the sample of researchers, we find
a higher probability of being a publisher but a greater gender gap (87% for men but only 75%
for women), and a particularly large diﬀerence in the quality of publications.15
The definition and construction of our two categories of departments is detailed in Ap-
pendix A and Table 10 gives the list of ‘international departments’. The last lines in the two
panels of Table 2 indicate that the one aspect in which women seem to fare better than men
is aﬃliation: in the larger sample 31% of women are in international departments, while only
28% of men are. When we focus only on researchers we find no diﬀerence in aﬃliation across
the genders.
4 Results
4.1 The promotion of academic economists
We start by examining the determinants of being rank A for the entire population, which are
reported in Table 3. In order to run regressions equivalent to those found in the literature
on promotions in academia, where only outcomes are observed, we construct a sample that
includes all rank A and rank B academics for each of the years that we will be using latter on
to estimate the probability of being a candidate and of being promoted conditional of being a
candidate. This gives us a sample of 20,154 observations. We can thus estimate the probability
of holding a rank A position. All specifications include year fixed eﬀects. In column (1), only
time fixed eﬀects and gender are included in the logit model, with the gender dummy being
equal to 1 for women. The marginal eﬀect on gender is significant at the 1% level and large at
-0.233, implying an odds ratio of 0.31.16 Including age reduces the eﬀect on gender to -0.162,
indicating that a large fraction of the diﬀerence in promotion is indeed due to the fact that
the sample of women is younger than that of men. Column (3) includes our three measures of
research output: whether or not the individual publishes, the quantity of publications and their
quality. All three are highly significant and increase the probability of promotion.
Once we control for research output, the eﬀect of gender falls to -0.057, about a quarter
of the initial one, indicating that the lower promotion rate for women is to a large extent due
to them having published less. The eﬀect is nevertheless still strong: being a woman reduces
the probability of promotion almost as much as having one rather than two single-authored
publications. The eﬀects we obtain are comparable to those found for the US. Ginther and
15Obviously some of the diﬀerences in research output are due to the age structure of the two populations, but
Bosquet and Combes (2013b) show that even when controlling for age women have worse publication records.
Women are sometimes also found to be cited less than men. This is the case in political sciences, as shown by
Maliniak, Powers and Walter (2013), while for publications in biomedical and exact sciences, Kelchtermans and
Veugelers (2013) find that women have a lower probability of reaching top citations but once they do they are as
likely as men to stay there. In contrast, the data we use exhibits no gender gap in citations once research output
is controlled for; see Bosquet and Combes (2013a).
16This values is obtained from exp(−1.182), −1.182 being the coeﬃcient associated to the −0.233 marginal
eﬀect.
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Table 3: Likelihood to hold a rank A position: panel 1992-2008, marginal eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logit logit logit logit probit OLS
Women -0.203a -0.149a -0.055a -0.051a -0.049a -0.045a
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Age 0.021a 0.016a 0.016a 0.016a 0.011a
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.309a 0.320a 0.318a 0.323a
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021)
Pub*Quantity 0.147a 0.150a 0.151a 0.178a
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Pub*Quality 0.035a 0.038a 0.038a 0.034a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cnrs -0.101a -0.095a -0.110a
(0.021) (0.022) (0.028)
Women*Cnrs -0.020 -0.018 -0.009
(0.060) (0.059) (0.055)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.039 0.125 0.362 0.367 0.366 0.394
Observations 20154 20154 20154 20154 20154 20154
log-likelihood -12565 -11437 -8335 -8275 -8286 -8657
Standard errors clustered by individuals between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Pseudo-R2: McFadden’s R2, R2 for OLS regression.
Kahn (2004) find a raw gender gap of -0.213, which falls to -0.130 once age and publication
records are included, indicating that diﬀerences in publications across genders explain a greater
fraction of the gap in France than in the US.
Column (4) includes a dummy for being a researcher and its interaction with Women, and
indicates that the negative eﬀect of being a woman on seniority is stronger for the Cnrs, although
this term is insignificant. Columns (5) and (6) report the estimations of a probit and an OLS
model, respectively, and indicate that the result that women are less likely to be promoted are
robust to the use of those specifications. There is however no robust evidence of a diﬀerence
between the two tracks, with the coeﬃcient on Women*Cnrs being insignificant.
The result that women have lower promotion rates than men contrasts with evidence on
aﬃliation. Table 11 in Appendix B examines the likelihood for an individual to be in an
international department, using the same explanatory variables as above. Women are more
likely to be in a prestigious department than men, and the eﬀect of being a woman on the
probability of being in an international department is large.17 These results are surprising. As
argued by Lazear and Rosen (1990), it is hard to understand why women would be discriminated
against in promotions but not in other labour market experiences. In fact, in many instances
the evidence tends to indicate that women have a lower probability of both being promoted and
17The positive eﬀect of being female on the likelihood of being in an international department may have three
causes. The first is positive discrimination when departments consciously try to increase their female faculty. A
second is unobservable abilities, such as organisational skills or teaching ability, which could be, on average, higher
amongst female than male academics, specially since fewer women than men enter academia (see Petrongolo and
Olivetti (2008) on selection and gender). Lastly, a strong female presence could be the result of joint oﬀers made
to couples by top departments.
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being hired, as for example in the case of top US orchestras; see Goldin and Rouse (2000). This
does not seem to be the case for academic economists, and raises the question of whether the
low promotion rate of female academics has a cause other than discrimination.
4.2 Decomposing outcomes
4.2.1 Gender diﬀerences in success in the concours
The limitation of our analysis so far is that it uses only outcomes and hence we do not know
whether lower observed promotions are the result of a lower likelihood to apply for promotion
or lower success in obtaining the promotions. We hence examine the two separate steps. We
start by considering what determines success in the contest conditional on being a candidate,
and then move to the determinants of the decision to enter the contest.
The determinants of success in the promotion contests are assumed to be gender and the
three variables measuring publications. We also include a dummy that captures whether the
individual was, at the time of application, in an international department. This variable could
measure unobserved ability –e.g. being a good teacher– or the positive eﬀects that being in a
more stimulating academic environment could have on the preparation of the concours. There
are as well externalities due to having colleagues who are also preparing the agregation since
candidates often work together and share the burden of preparing lectures on the various topics.
Lastly, in the regression for the agregation we include a dummy for whether the candidate holds
a position other than rank B university professor in economics (i.e. the candidate is in the Cnrs,
in another field such as mathematics, comes from abroad, etc.).
The results, reported in the first four columns of Table 4, indicate that research output is
the key determinant of the probability of success both in the agregation and the Cnrs concours.
In the former all three measures of research output have a significant coeﬃcient, while for the
Cnrs promotion only quantity and quality matters. This is consistent with the fact that there is
a stronger selection for those joining the Cnrs than for those following the standard university
track, implying that the latter are more likely to be non-publishers. Being in an international
department has a positive impact on the probability of passing the agregation, in line with our
arguments before, while it has no impact on the probability of being promoted in the Cnrs
contest.
Turning to our coeﬃcient of interest, the impact of being female on the probability of success
conditional on being a candidate for promotion, there is a negative but not significant diﬀerence
across the genders. In fact, the probability of success in the agregation is 24.8% for men and
24.1% for women, and hence not significantly diﬀerent. The coeﬃcient is insignificant both for
the raw probabilities and also when we control for individual characteristics, for professors and
researchers. Gender simply does not matter.
To interpret this result consider first the Cnrs concours. Recall that the concours consists
of submitting a vitae and a research proposal. The candidate does not ‘perform’ in front of the
committee taking the promotion decision, hence the only reason why we would expect to find a
negative coeﬃcient on women would be discrimination. We can then interpret the insignificant
coeﬃcient as a lack of evidence of ex post discrimination against women in the contest. This
does not mean that discrimination does not matter, since expectations of discrimination may
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Table 4: Likelihood to be promoted conditional on applying, marginal eﬀects
Agreg’ Cnrs Agreg’: selected candidates
1992-2008 1996-2008 1992-2008
All candidates All candidates “Admissibles” Close to threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Women -0.007 -0.018 -0.068 -0.053 0.044 0.040 0.097 0.103
(0.032) (0.027) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) (0.056) (0.079) (0.084)
Age -0.018c -0.044c -0.033 -0.042
(0.010) (0.023) (0.025) (0.039)
Age2 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Publisher(Pub) 0.155a -0.016 0.112 0.142
(0.049) (0.121) (0.093) (0.138)
Pub*Quantity 0.091a 0.077b 0.032 -0.024
(0.019) (0.038) (0.040) (0.061)
Pub*Quality 0.047a 0.032b 0.031b 0.024
(0.006) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021)
Int. Dept. 0.090a 0.018 0.130a 0.117
(0.030) (0.063) (0.044) (0.075)
Other -0.030 0.008 0.008
(0.033) (0.069) (0.105)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.015 0.183 0.018 0.161 0.015 0.056 0.005 0.025
Observations 970 970 258 218 336 336 198 198
log-likelihood -531 -441 -123 -92 -201 -192 -137 -134
Standard errors clustered by individuals between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Other: non-French Assistant
Professors positions in economics, as well as Cnrs and Inra researchers, and assistant professors from other
disciplines.
have an ex ante eﬀect on women’s choices and hence on observed outcomes, as discussed above.
In the case of the agregation, interpreting the coeﬃcient is more complicated as it captures
both potential biases in the committee and the actual performance of the candidate during the
oral exams that we cannot observe. A negative and significant coeﬃcient could then be due
to either discrimination or underperformance by women, as in the experiments performed by
Gneezy et al. (2003). Our results find no evidence of either discrimination against or underper-
formance by women.
The absence of a gender gap in the conditional promotion probability in the two tracks can
also be due to discrimination being oﬀset by over-performance or that, more generally, selection
is an issue. Since fewer women are candidates than men, as we will see below, it is possible
that they are drawn from the top of the distribution and hence that their unobserved ability
is higher than that of men. The insignificant coeﬃcient could then be the result of opposing
eﬀects canceling out: higher unobserved ability of women and discrimination against them.
To try to control for this, we perform two further tests exploiting the fact that for the agre-
gation contest we have information on which individuals passed each stage of the competition,
as well as the final rank. At the various stages of the competition, a number of candidates are
eliminated, and after the penultimate stage a list of candidates that are admissibles is provided
by the jury. These candidates then undertake the final test, after which a ranking of all admis-
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sible candidates is provided and, if p positions are available that year, the top p candidates are
promoted.
The first test focuses on admissible candidates only. Since at this stage a substantial number
of candidates have been eliminated, if selection implies that the unobserved quality of male
candidates is lower than that of female candidates, focusing on the ‘best’ should eliminate the
(predominantly male) bottom tail of the distribution. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 present
those regressions and indicate that there is no diﬀerence between men and women in either the
raw rate of passing the last step of the context or the one obtained after controlling for output.
Not surprisingly, only the quality of publications matters at this stage. To make our sample
even more comparable, we construct from the final ranking of candidates a list of individuals
close to the threshold. To do so we take, for each year, the n admissible candidates that did not
get promoted and the n lowest-ranked candidates that did get promoted and rerun the same
regression equations. If discrimination against women were taking place, it would be likely
to appear in this reduced sample of candidates with similar observable (and probably close
unobservable) characteristics. The last two columns of Table 4 show that, if anything, women
are positively discriminated although the coeﬃcient is not significant.
4.2.2 Likelihood to enter the concours
We turn now to the determinants of the likelihood to enter the concours. The results are
reported in Table 5. The unconditional probability of applying is lower for women than for men
both for university professors and researchers (column 1), and the negative impact of being
female is even larger once we include individual characteristics, the marginal eﬀect being -0.036
for professors and -0.107 for researchers. As expected, research output has a strong eﬀect on the
likelihood of being a candidate in either of the concours, with quality having a stronger eﬀect for
researchers. Being in an international department is significant only in the case of professors,
where it tends to increase the probability of being a candidate. This may be due to the fact
that, as we saw earlier, being in a top department has a positive eﬀect of the probability of
success; potential candidates may anticipate this and hence be more likely to apply if they are
in those departments. An additional eﬀect may come from peer pressure to pass the concours.
Removing this variable from the analysis has no impact on the other estimated coeﬃcients.
The results indicate that women have a lower likelihood to enter the contest for promotion.
In terms of magnitude, being a woman is equivalent to decreasing the number of single-authored
publications by around 0.6 for the university professors and 1 for the Cnrs researchers,18 or to
decreasing the quality of publications by 87% and 113% of its standard deviation, for the
university professors and the Cnrs researchers, respectively.19
In order to try to understand what lies behind the gender gap in seeking promotion, we
examine whether the eﬀect of gender diﬀers between the two types of positions. Since the costs
of the agregation contest are substantially larger than those of applying for promotion at the
Cnrs, the coeﬃcient on women should be higher for university professors than for researchers if
18The regression coeﬃcients on gender and quantity in the regressions for the likelihood to apply for the
agregation and to apply for a Cnrs promotion are, respectively, −0.467, 0.730, −0.938 and 0.915.
19The coeﬃcients on gender and quality in the agregation and the Cnrs promotion regressions are, respectively,
−0.467, 0.165, −0.938 and 0.256, and 3.25 is the standard deviation of the average quality of publications in our
sample.
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Table 5: Likelihood to apply for a promotion: marginal eﬀects
Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 1996-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
logit logit probit OLS logit logit probit OLS
Women -0.048a -0.036a -0.040a -0.040a -0.104a -0.107a -0.101a -0.089b
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)
Age 0.005 0.003 -0.009b 0.110a 0.108a 0.097a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Age2 -0.001a -0.000a 0.000 -0.003a -0.002a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.129a 0.129a 0.149a 0.107 0.098 0.113c
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.076) (0.074) (0.060)
Pub*Quantity 0.059a 0.058a 0.065a 0.114a 0.105a 0.110a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032)
Pub*Quality 0.013a 0.014a 0.017a 0.032a 0.030a 0.031b
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Int. Dept. 0.022b 0.023b 0.024b 0.018 0.022 0.020
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045)
Cnrs -0.122a -0.120a -0.183a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.017 0.199 0.194 0.120 0.039 0.208 0.201 0.179
Observations 7209 7209 7209 7209 1004 1004 1004 1004
log-likelihood -2427 -1978 -1990 -1338 -479 -395 -398 -401
Standard errors clustered by individuals between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Pseudo-R2: McFadden’s R2,
R2 for OLS regressions.
diﬀerences across the genders in these costs where holding back potential female candidates. The
first column of Table 6 hence runs a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression where we have pooled
together the data for the two concours. We interact all variables with a dummy taking the value
1 for the Cnrs concours to allow for diﬀerent impacts across the two tracks, our coeﬃcient of
interest being women interacted with this dummy.20 The coeﬃcient is negative but insignificant
at the 10% level, implying that the eﬀect of gender on the likelihood to enter the promotion
contest is not higher for standard professors than in the research track. This result indicates
that the time-cost of preparing the agregation and the implications in terms of mobility are not
the main reason why women are less likely than men to apply for promotion.
As we discussed earlier, if women have a stronger relative preference for department prestige,
they may choose not to apply for promotion in order to stay in an international department.
Since promotion implies mobility for university professors, if females cared more about depart-
ment quality they would be less willing to move –and hence to pass the agregation– whenever
they are in an international than in a national department. In contrast, for researchers pro-
motion does not require changing department and we expect to find no eﬀect of department of
origin on the likelihood of seeking a promotion.
We hence run again the regressions for the likelihood to apply for promotion and include
an interaction between being a woman and being in a top department. If the trade-oﬀ between
rank (i.e. income) and department quality diﬀered across the genders, this would be captured
20To save space, other interacted terms are not reported but are available upon request.
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by a negative coeﬃcient on being in a top department for female professors but not for female
researchers.
Table 6: Diﬀerences across tracks and departments: likelihood to apply for a promotion,
marginal eﬀects
All Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 1996-2008
(1) (2) (3)
logit logit logit
Women -0.037a -0.049a -0.112b
(0.009) (0.009) (0.057)
Age 0.012a 0.005 0.109a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.018)
Age2 -0.001a -0.001a -0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.140a 0.129a 0.107
(0.021) (0.020) (0.076)
Pub*Quantity 0.062a 0.059a 0.114a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.030)
Pub*Quality 0.014a 0.013a 0.032a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
Int. Dept. 0.026b 0.009 0.015
(0.011) (0.012) (0.050)
Cnrs*Women -0.021
(0.025)
Women*Int. Dept. 0.042c 0.010
(0.022) (0.104)
Cnrs -0.122a
(0.004)
Interacted terms Yes No No
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.196 0.200 0.208
Observations 8213 7209 1004
log-likelihood -2410 -1974 -395
Standard errors clustered by individuals between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Interacted terms: all variables
interacted with applying to the Cnrs contest.
The marginal eﬀects obtained from these regressions are reported in the second and third
columns of Table 6. Being in an international department does not aﬀect the likelihood of female
researchers applying for promotion, while it has a positive eﬀect on whether females enter the
agregation. For male university professors, the department of origin seems not to matter. This
indicates, first, that the eﬀect on being in an international department we obtained earlier is
driven by the eﬀect on women in top departments. Second, note that when we consider together
the two eﬀects, that of women and that of women interacted with international department
they roughly cancel out. This seems to indicate that, for university professors, women in
top departments are as likely as men to enter the concours. In contrast, women in national
departments and those with a research position have a lower probability of being candidates for
promotion.
Our results indicate that there is a substantial diﬀerence in the likelihood that men and
women academics apply for promotion. The negative and significant coeﬃcient is robust to
diﬀerent specifications of the model, such as the probit and OLS. We also run (not reported) a
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random eﬀects model to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, as well as a duration model where
we estimate time to first application for promotion. Both yielded equivalent results, indicating
a lower propensity of women to seek promotion. This gap appears both for professors and
researchers despite the diﬀerences in the costs and implications of promotion, indicating that
neither the direct costs associated with the concours nor diﬀerences in the way in which men
and women trade-oﬀ income and department quality are the causes of the gender gap in seeking
promotion.
In order to gauge the importance of women’s lower propensity to apply for promotion, we
perform a Oaxaca decomposition. Given the diﬃculty of interpreting decomposition stemming
from logit regressions, we perform the decomposition using the OLS regressions in Table 5,
columns (4) and (8). For professors in our sample, the raw gender gap in the probability of
being promoted in a given year to rank A amounts to 2.4 percentage points. Although this
magnitude seems small, the probability of being promoted in a given year is only 4.7% for men.
As we have seen, this diﬀerence is driven by the decision to be a candidate, with an average
male probability of being a candidate of 12.5% and that for women being 4.7 percentage points
lower, i.e. gender reduces the likelihood to apply for promotion by 38%. In the Cnrs, the annual
raw probability of promotion is 60% lower for women than for men, and the raw probability of
being a candidate over 29% lower.
Table 7: Oaxaca decomposition of the likelihood to apply
Agregation Cnrs
∆Pr(C) % ∆Pr(C) %
Total gap .046 100 .104 100
Women .040 86 .089 86
Characteristics .006 14 .015 14
Age -.013 -29 -.006 -6
Total outcome .024 52 .021 21
Publisher .014 30 .014 13
Quantity .012 27 .021 20
Quality -.002 -5 -.013 -12
International Department -.001 -2 -.001 -1
Cnrs -.003 -7 . .
To get rid of time fixed eﬀects, the decomposition is made for each year
separately before averaging over the full sample, with the number of
observations per year as weights.
The two first column of Table 7 present the Oaxaca decomposition for the probability of being
a candidate to the agregation, based on column (4) of Table 5. Columns (3) and (4) present the
same decomposition for the probability of being a candidate to a DR position at the Cnrs. For
both tracks, the gender gap in the probability of being a candidate is driven by the direct eﬀect
of gender, which amounts to 86% of the overall gap. The rest is due to better characteristics of
men, with a positive contribution of research output which is partly compensated by the lower
age of women.21 Both decompositions hence imply that the application gap comes mainly from
21Interestingly, when we look at the three components of research output we see that for both groups women
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the direct eﬀect of being female, with their lower publication record accounting for between 21
and 52% of the gap, and being partly oﬀset by women being younger and in better departments.
4.3 Networks and the competitive environment
4.3.1 Network eﬀects
One possible reason for diﬀerences in the likelihood of seeking a promotion is that there is some
individual variable that we have so far ignored and which has an impact on the actual (or
perceived) probability of success. A candidate explanation are research networks or groups of
coauthors. The idea that networks are important in obtaining jobs and achieving promotions is
widespread in the literature, and the issue has been addressed for promotions in academia; see
McDowell and Smith (1992) for the US, Combes et al. (2008) for France and Zinovyevay and
Bagues (2012) for Spain. Coauthor networks have been shown to diﬀer across genders, with
females having fewer coauthors and a lower fraction of male coauthors; see McDowell and Smith
(1992) and Boschini and Sjo¨gren (2007). If women have smaller or less eﬃcient networks, then
this may aﬀect the expected outcome and hence the payoﬀ from entering the competition for
promotion. Potential reasons for this eﬀect are that a candidate who has a member of her/his
network in a promotion committee has a higher likelihood of success, but also that with a larger
network the candidate’s work may be better known and cited, or that this could provide extra
information about how to best prepare for a concours. As a result, the gap that we find between
men and women could be due to diﬀerences in coauthors and networks, and hence including
these variables would have an eﬀect on the coeﬃcient on gender.
In order to test this hypothesis, we construct for each individual two measures of networks.
Our measures are based on coauthorship, obviously an imperfect measure of actual networks,
but one that is quantifiable with the EconLit data. Our first measure is the size of an individ-
ual’s network, defined as the total number of diﬀerent coauthors the researcher has had over
his/her publishing lifetime; the second is the fraction of network members that are men. More
than in other contexts, academic networks are highly endogenous, with research output and
aﬃliation being both causes and consequences of an individual’s network size, and patterns
of network formation have been shown to diﬀer across the genders; see Boschini and Sjo¨gren
(2007). Moreover, being a candidate for promotion can increase networks, especially in a system
where individuals are often candidates several years, and as a result any eﬀect we find has to
be interpreted with care.
Table 8 reports the regressions for the likelihood of entering the promotion contest for the
two tracks, to which we have added network variables. Both variables have positive coeﬃcients
although only the proportion of men is significant at the 5 or 10% level, depending on the
estimation procedure. For university professors, the coeﬃcients on gender barely change as
compared to our earlier specifications, while in the case of researchers the coeﬃcients are some-
what less negative than in previous specifications (for the logit it goes from -0.107 in Table 5
to -0.100). That is, gender diﬀerences in networks do not seem to explain the lower propensity
of women to seek promotion. The reason is probably that diﬀerences is network size across
are less likely to be publishers and, especially, have fewer publications, but they exhibit the same or a higher
quality of publications than men.
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Table 8: Network eﬀects: likelihood to apply for a promotion, marginal eﬀects
Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs, panel 1996-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logit probit OLS logit probit OLS
Women -0.035a -0.038a -0.039a -0.100a -0.094a -0.081b
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038)
Age 0.004 0.002 -0.009b 0.109a 0.107a 0.096a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Age2 -0.001a -0.000a 0.000 -0.002a -0.002a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.116a 0.113a 0.131a 0.044 0.024 0.027
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.078) (0.076) (0.068)
Pub*Quantity 0.058a 0.057a 0.066a 0.106a 0.099a 0.104a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
Pub*Quality 0.012a 0.012a 0.015a 0.025b 0.023b 0.022c
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Int. Dept. 0.021b 0.022b 0.024b 0.022 0.023 0.021
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Cnrs -0.122a -0.121a -0.183a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
Pub*Network size 0.006 0.009 -0.000 0.026 0.025 0.038
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037)
% Men in Network 0.021c 0.023b 0.028c 0.093c 0.100b 0.091c
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.201 0.196 0.120 0.222 0.215 0.191
Observations 7209 7209 7209 1004 1004 1004
log-likelihood -1974 -1985 -1334 -388 -391 -393
Standard errors clustered by individuals between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. Pseudo-R2: McFadden’s R2,
R2 for OLS regressions.
genders are minor and not statistically significant. There is a greater gap in the fraction of men
in the network, which are 70% for females in the agregation sample and 80% for males, and
although it is significant the eﬀect of this variable is moderate and hence its inclusion barely
aﬀects the coeﬃcient on gender.
4.3.2 The competition’s environment
Our final test consists of examining whether the environment under which the competition takes
place aﬀects men and women diﬀerently. We consider two variables. The first is the proportion
of women amongst rank A professors in the year of the competition, which can act as a proxy
for ‘perceived discrimination’. This variable has increased steadily over the period, going from
8.9% in 1992 to 15.2% in 2008. The other variable is the number of available positions as
professor, which is usually known before the decision to be a candidate is taken, and fluctuates
between 15 and 33.
Since the eﬀects of these variables can be identified only over the time dimension of the
data we consider only the concours d’agregation for which we have a much larger number of
observations. Because we are exploiting the time dimension of the data we cannot include time
fixed eﬀects as well as the variables of interest for the entire population. We hence consider two
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specifications. One includes time fixed eﬀects and our two variables of interest interacted with
the female dummy, which allows us to see whether eﬀects diﬀer across the genders but not to
identify the impact on men. Alternatively, we substitute the fixed eﬀects by a time trend and
estimate the impact of these variables for both men and women.
Table 9: The competition’s environment: likelihood to apply for a promotion, agregation, panel
1992-2008, marginal eﬀects
Agreg’, panel 1992-2008 Cnrs*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
logit logit logit logit logit
Women -0.143a -0.127a -0.137a -0.038a -0.067a
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.007) (0.022)
Age 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.006 0.040a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013)
Age2 -0.001a -0.001a -0.001a -0.000 -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.128a 0.128a 0.128a 0.115a 0.034
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.044)
Pub*Quantity 0.059a 0.059a 0.059a 0.042a 0.058a
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.019)
Pub*Quality 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.013a 0.018a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
Int. Dept. 0.022b 0.022b 0.012 0.021b 0.023
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.028)
Cnrs -0.122a -0.122a -0.122a -0.113a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Time trend -0.016a
(0.005)
% Women rank A 0.020
(0.014)
Women*% Women rank A 0.010c 0.009c 0.009c
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Avail.Pos. 0.003a
(0.001)
Women*Avail.Pos. -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Women*Int.Dept*Avail.Pos. 0.001c
(0.001)
Already applied 0.151a 0.564a
(0.019) (0.072)
Women*Already applied 0.021 -0.062
(0.019) (0.048)
Time FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.200 0.199 0.201 0.247 0.414
Observations 7209 7209 7209 7209 1004
log-likelihood -1975 -1977 -1973 -1858 -292
Standard errors clustered by individuals between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Int. Dept. = international department; see Appendix A for details. * panel 1996-2008.
Table 9 presents the estimated regressions. Column (1) indicates that the fraction of women
amongst rank A professors has a greater eﬀect on women than on men, and our specification
with a time trend implies that this variable has no significant eﬀect on men but a positive and
significant one for women. This is consistent with the idea that perceived discrimination is a
potential cause for females’ lower propensity to apply for promotion. In contrast, the number
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of available positions has no diﬀerential eﬀect across the genders, as seen in column (1).
In column (2) we try to identify the eﬀects for both men and women. We can see that the
number of females amongst rank A professors has no eﬀect on the decision to seek promotion of
men, while a greater number of available positions increases the likelihood of being a candidate,
capturing the idea that more positions imply a greater probability of being promoted and hence
encourages individuals to apply. The coeﬃcient is not significantly diﬀerent across genders.
To further explore this aspect we ask whether all groups of women behave in the same way.
A possible division is between women who are in a national and those in an international de-
partment. Women in diﬀerent types of departments may react diﬀerently towards competition
because of unobserved characteristics. Column (3) indicates that there is indeed a diﬀerence in
the coeﬃcients on the number of available positions for the two groups, with women in inter-
national departments being more responsive to the number of positions available. A possible
interpretation of this result is that women in international departments are less self-confident
than males and hence are more likely to decide not to seek promotion when the number of
positions available is small.
Lastly, we examine whether past rejections aﬀect the decision to enter the contest. The
last two columns on Table 9 look at this question by adding to our core regression a dummy
for whether the individual has entered the previous concours, using data for both tracks. The
variable has a positive and highly significant coeﬃcient, probably measuring unobserved ability,
but the dummy interacted with gender is not significant. Other specifications, for example with
the number of times the individual has already seek promotion, also yielded results with no
diﬀerences across the genders in the impact of past experience. That is, past lack of success
in the promotion contest does not seem to aﬀect diﬀerentially the decision of whether to apply
again.
5 Conclusions
This paper has used data for promotions amongst academic economists in France to look at
the attitudes of women during and towards contests. We have information both on who was a
candidate for promotion and who could have been a candidate, which allows us to test diﬀerent
hypotheses about the reasons that cause women’s lower promotion rates.
On the one hand, women may be less likely to be promoted conditional on having applied,
and this could be due either to discrimination or underperformance during the promotion con-
test. On the other, female academics may have a lower propensity to apply for promotion
than males. This could in turn be caused by the requirements of the contest being more costly
for women, their facing a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ between salaries and department prestige, or an
unwillingness to enter the contest. The features of the French academic system, such as a na-
tional salary scale, the need to go through a national contest in order to be promoted, and the
existence of several categories of academics with diﬀerent requirements during the contest and
upon promotion, allow us to test for these hypotheses.
We find that there is no significant diﬀerence between men and women in their probability
of success, but that the later are less likely than the former to enter contests. Moreover, our
results indicate that neither the diﬀerential cost of promotion nor the trade-oﬀ between income
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and department quality are behind these diﬀerences.
There are two possible explanations for our findings. One is that although women are not
discriminated against during the contest they believe they will be, and hence decide not to enter
the competition for promotion. The data points at this as a partial cause of gender diﬀerences,
with women being more likely to apply the more females there are amongst top-rank academics.
The alternative explanation is that women are less willing than men to enter contests, in line
with the experimental evidence provided by Gneezy et al. (2003), amongst others. When we try
to assess the impact of the competition’s environment, we find that, women in top departments
are particularly sensitive to the number of available positions in a given year, which could be
seen as a stronger reaction to the perceived degree of competition.
Our results have two main implications. On the one hand, they provide a link between
laboratory evidence and behaviour observed in actual markets. They indicate that patterns
of behaviour, namely women’s lower propensity to take part in contests, can be observed in
actual labour markets and have important consequences for observed outcomes. On the other,
they raise the question of what type of policy intervention can help increase female promotion
rates. The evidence in Gneezy et al. (2003) indicates that diﬀerences in contest participation
seem to be partly driven by women being less confident than men. Building confidence is a
process that is diﬃcult and probably starts in early childhood, but changes in the way in which
deciding whether to enter a competition occurs could facilitate women’s probabilities of climbing
up the rank ladder. For example, a system of mentoring whereby junior faculty are assigned
a mentor that ‘proposes’ them as candidates for promotion may incite more women to apply.
Alternatively, creating a system in which the default is that an individual will be considered
for promotion after x years and s/he has to opt out instead of opting in, could also be a way of
overcoming the diﬀerences in confidence across the genders.
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Appendix
A Definition of international departments
Academia in France is organised around ‘research centers’, with a university potentially having
several research centers in economics. We have defined ‘departments’ either by an economics
department when it is the single aﬃliation where economists are found in a given university
(which corresponds to the majority of cases), or by the aggregation of all research centres
where there are economists in the university. We performed robustness checks by looking
at research centres rather than departments, and obtained consistent results (available upon
request). However, our notion of slightly aggregated economics departments better matches the
reality of French academic research and hence we have focused our discussion of the results on
this concept.
We define ‘international departments’ as departments with the highest research output,
measured by both the total stock and average stock of publications per member of the depart-
ment in EconLit journals. The cutoﬀ point for top departments is arbitrary. We choose our
cutoﬀ at each point in time so as to have 35% of the total population in the top department
category. Since departments may change their status over time, we considered as international
departments for the entire sample period those departments which are more often than not in
the top department category.
Table 10: List of international departments
Cepremap 1991 2004
Crest 1993 2008
Ecole Polytechnique 1991 2008
Ehess-Ens (Delta) 1991 2004
Enpc (Ceras, Latts) 1991 2004
Hec 1995 2008
University Aix Marseille 2-3 1991 2008
University Cergy 2005 2008
University Cergy-Paris 10 1991 2004
University Clermont 1 1991 2008
University Nancy 2-Strasbourg 2006 2008
University Paris 1 1991 2004
Paris School of Economics 2005 2008
University Paris 10 2005 2008
University Paris 9 1991 2008
Toulouse School of Economics 1991 2008
The last two columns give the first and last date at which the
departments are observed in the sample, respectively. Note
that some departments have been merged, as for instance
the Cepremap, the Ehess-Ens and the University Paris 1 to
form the Paris School of Economics from 2005.
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B Likelihood to be in an international department and to hold
a rank A position by category
Table 11: Likelihood to be in an international department and to hold a rank A position by
category, 1992-2008, marginal eﬀects
International department Rank A
All All All Univ. Cnrs Univ. Cnrs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logit logit logit logit logit logit logit
Women 0.021 0.022 0.068a 0.071a 0.101 -0.064a -0.101c
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.067) (0.017) (0.052)
Age -0.009a -0.008a -0.008a -0.011 0.011a 0.071a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.009)
Age2 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000 0.000 -0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Publisher(Pub) 0.190a 0.197a 0.107 0.324a 0.064
(0.027) (0.028) (0.089) (0.028) (0.067)
Pub*Quantity 0.053a 0.049a 0.080b 0.147a 0.148a
(0.011) (0.011) (0.035) (0.009) (0.018)
Pub*Quality 0.049a 0.047a 0.063a 0.041a 0.039a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.010)
Cnrs 0.168a
(0.036)
Women*Cnrs 0.039
(0.062)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pseudo-R2 0.015 0.017 0.097 0.056 0.121 0.347 0.464
Observations 17466 17466 17466 14848 2618 14848 2618
log-likelihood -11077 -11056 -10158 -8578 -1557 -6212 -954
Standard errors clustered by individuals between brackets. a, b, c Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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